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 Controlling Internal Controls 
 Two recent examinations of management practices in 
three federal departments provide contemporary evidence 
of the need to incorporate procedures like those of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the public sector. Although each 
department established what appeared to be well-
designed internal controls, all lacked suffi  cient monitor-
ing and assessment of the effi  cacy of those controls. By 
requiring senior management to attest to the strength of 
their control mechanisms, as required by the newly 
revised OMB Circular A-123, the quality of this 
monitoring should improve. Findings from a recent study 
of private-sector implementation of these reforms are 
described, along with suggestions for public administra-
tion research and practice at all levels of government. 
 Public documents discussed: 
 ●  Primary: Revisions to OMB Circular A-123, 
 “ Management ’ s Responsibility for Internal Controls, ” 
issued December 21, 2004, eff ective October 1, 2005. 
 ●  Secondary: U.S. Government Accountability 
Offi  ce,  “ Managerial Cost Accounting Practices: 
Leadership and Internal Controls are Key to Suc-
cessful Implementation ” (GAO-05-1013R) and 
 “ Defense Management: DOD Needs to Demon-
strate that Performance-Based Logistics Contracts 
are Achieving Expected Benefi ts ” (GAO-05-966) 
 It is not enough for agencies to have internal controls 
over their critical processes; the new standard for federal 
agencies under OMB (Offi  ce of Management and Bud-
get) Circular A-123 (2004) is to ensure that those con-
trols are eff ective. Recent audits by the Government 
Accountability Offi  ce (GAO) provide some insight into 
how well the federal government is controlling its internal 
controls. Likewise, a recent assessment of publicly traded 
fi rms provides helpful insights for public managers. 
 Internal controls are defi ned by the American Institute of 
Certifi ed Public Accountants, in its Statement of Audit-
ing Standards No. 55, as the policies and procedures 
promulgated by management to provide reasonable 
assurance that specifi c entity objectives will be achieved 
 (American Institute of Certifi ed Public Accountants, 
1988). Th e GAO uses a similar defi nition:  “ An integral 
component of an organization ’ s management that pro-
vides reasonable assurance that the following objectives 
are being achieved: eff ectiveness and effi  ciency of opera-
tions, reliability of fi nancial reporting, and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations ” (GAO 1999). 
 Th e revised OMB Circular A-123 took eff ect at the 
beginning of the 2006 federal fi scal year on October 1, 
2005. Th is revision incorporated an essential require-
ment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was enacted in 
2002 in response to scandals among publicly traded 
corporations. Section 404 of the act requires auditors 
of companies to include in their annual reports an 
assessment of internal controls that (1) states the re-
sponsibility of management for establishing and main-
taining an adequate internal control structure and 
procedures for fi nancial reporting; and (2) contains an 
assessment, as of the end of the issuer ’ s fi scal year, of 
the eff ectiveness of the internal control structure and 
procedures of the issuer for fi nancial reporting. 
 Similarly, a fundamental purpose of the revision to 
OMB Circular A-123 was to  “ emphasize manage-
ment ’ s responsibility for assessing and documenting 
internal control over fi nancial reporting ” ( Bolton 
2004 ). Financial reporting is broadly defi ned to in-
clude not only the fi nancial statements required under 
the Chief Financial Offi  cers Act but also any  “ reports 
that could have a material eff ect on a signifi cant 
spending, budgetary or other fi nancial decision ” at 
multiple levels of the organization ( Bolton 2004 ). 
Management must be able to document the assess-
ment process and methodology used to support its 
assertion about the eff ectiveness of the internal con-
trols. Incorporating the broadest interpretation, not 
only is management responsible for implementing 
internal controls to provide reasonable assurance 
the agency meets its intended objectives, it is also 
responsible for self-assessing, correcting, and reporting 
on the effi  cacy of those controls. In short, controlling 
the internal controls is the new standard. 
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 Th e revision of OMB Circular A-123 provides the 
framework for those tasks. It not only states the objec-
tives of internal control, it also defi nes management ’ s 
responsibility to develop and maintain control activi-
ties that comply with fi ve standards: (1) control envi-
ronment, (2) risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4) 
information and communication, and (5) monitoring. 
Th e circular integrates the related legislative and regu-
latory requirements and issues guidance on assessing, 
correcting, and reporting on internal controls. 
 Recently, the GAO issued two reports that provide 
some insight into how well the federal government is 
doing on this front. Although these reports do not 
directly address agencies ’ reporting on the effi  cacy of 
their controls, by serving as examples of the practice 
of controlling controls, they provide a preview of 
federal government activity in this area. 
 In the fi rst report, the GAO reviewed the federal 
Departments of Labor and Veterans Aff airs (VA) to 
determine how cost-accounting information is gener-
ated and how that information is used to support 
managerial decision making and provide accountabil-
ity (GAO 2005b). According to the GAO report, such 
accounting  “ involves the accumulation and analysis of 
fi nancial and non-fi nancial data, resulting in the allo-
cation of costs to organizational pursuits such as per-
formance goals, programs, activities, and outputs. ” 
Clearly, then, management cost accounting itself is an 
internal control device. 
 One sees in the report that although the two depart-
ments employ diff erent strategies to implement  
cost-accounting systems, both (plan to) use 
cost-accounting data for budgetary and resource-
allocation decisions. What the GAO found is that 
controls on cost-accounting practices should be 
strengthened in both departments. Th e VA, by policy 
and by design, does not direct managerial cost activi-
ties at the departmental level; it delegates that respon-
sibility to the heads of the three subordinate agencies. 
Th ose agencies, in turn, supply cost information for 
department-wide reporting. 
 Th ough the fi nancial data feeding the cost-accounting 
systems is sound, the GAO had concerns about the 
reliability of the nonfi nancial data in the cost-
accounting system used by the Veterans Health 
Administration (VHA), evidenced by prior audits and 
inspector general fi ndings. Nonfi nancial data are 
crucial to the decision-support information provided 
by managerial cost-accounting systems; unreliability 
could skew management decision making. Th e VHA 
noted that it had disseminated audit guides for nonfi -
nancial data to its agencies, but the GAO stated that 
although promulgation of policy is a critical step, there 
was insuffi  cient documentation that the audits were 
conducted, and the risk of inaccurate data remains. 
 Th e Department of Labor implemented a new mana-
gerial cost-accounting system in September 2004. Its 
strategy was to employ a commercial software tool at 
the departmental level and to have each subordinate 
agency fashion models using the tool. Th e system 
integrates performance and fi nancial data, bench-
marks performance, provides trend analysis, and al-
lows for sensitivity analysis. Policies and procedures 
are being updated and training conducted, and refi ne-
ments are planned. Th e implementation plans are 
laudable, but again, the GAO cited the department ’ s 
lack of postimplementation review as a weakness. Th e 
GAO also applauded the quality of the fi nancial data 
audits but also found weakness in the reliability of 
controls over nonfi nancial data, as in the VA fi ndings. 
 In the second GAO report, performance-based logis-
tics contracts in the U.S. Department of Defense were 
assessed to determine whether they are achieving their 
expected benefi ts (GAO 2005a). Since the late 1990s, 
Defense Department leadership has increasingly advo-
cated the use of performance-based contracts for 
weapons system logistics support. Th e 2001 Quadren-
nial Defense Review validated the approach on the 
grounds performance-based contracts lead to com-
pressed supply chains, streamlined processes, reduced 
inventory levels, and reduced cost while improving 
readiness. Again, if we defi ne internal controls as the 
policies and procedures eff ected by management to 
provide reasonable assurance that specifi c entity objec-
tives will be achieved, performance-based contracts 
serve as a mechanism for control. 
 Th e GAO assessed 15 performance-based logistics 
programs from a list provided by the Defense Depart-
ment of those it considered successful. To ensure the 
eff ectiveness of the arrangements, the department 
issued guidance to the services that recommended a 
business-case analysis be prepared before adopting a 
performance-based logistics approach in order to 
justify the decision and to establish cost and perfor-
mance goals. Furthermore, the guidance recom-
mended that program offi  ces update the analysis at 
appropriate decision points after implementation to 
validate assumptions and assess actual performance 
and costs. Th ese ex poste analyses were to use data 
from the monitoring strategy for the performance-
based contract. 
 Th e GAO found that only one of the 15 programs 
actually completed an ex poste business-case analysis 
consistent with the guidance. According to the report, 
 “ In general, program offi  ces had not updated their 
business case analysis . . . because they assumed that 
the costs for weapon system maintenance incurred 
under a fi xed-price, performance-based logistics con-
tract would always be lower . . . and because they 
lacked reliable cost and performance data needed to 
validate assumptions ” (GAO 2005a). Senior Defense 
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Department leadership had not established procedures 
to monitor compliance with the guidance. 
 Th ese two GAO examinations of management prac-
tices in three federal departments provide contempo-
rary evidence of the need to incorporate procedures 
like those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the public 
sector. Although each department established what 
appeared to be well-designed internal controls, all 
lacked suffi  cient monitoring and assessment of the 
effi  cacy of those controls. By requiring senior man-
agement to attest to the strength of their controls, 
the quality of the monitoring should improve. 
 Th ese rules are now being applied in the public sector, 
just a few years after they were applied in the com-
mercial sector. Since the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002, publicly traded fi rms have been 
required to make such attestations. In the fi rst survey 
of the state of aff airs among publicly traded fi rms,  Ge 
and McVay (2005) sampled 261 companies that dis-
closed weaknesses in their internal controls. Th ey 
found that  “ inadequate accounting resources under-
pin the majority of internal control weaknesses. ” 
Complex fi rms were more likely to have material 
weaknesses in their controls than relatively simple 
ones. Th e most frequently cited problem was em-
ployee training. In order of decreasing frequency, 
specifi c issues included period-end accounting proce-
dures and revenue recognition — weak controls in 
these areas increase the risk of misstating crucial per-
formance information (earnings) — account reconcilia-
tion, and segregation of duties. 
 Ge and McVay ’ s fi ndings are consistent with the two 
recent (and many prior) GAO audits described here. 
Whether the employees who implemented the de-
signed controls were using them eff ectively was a con-
sistent theme of the GAO audits. Although revenue 
recognition does not have the same import in the 
public sector, solid internal control programs should 
target the most signifi cant areas, whatever they are, and 
the Defense Department audit clearly cited a weakness 
in a signifi cant area. Likewise, period-end accounting 
procedures and account reconciliation were both cited 
in the cost-accounting audits of the VA and Labor 
Departments. Government managers and executives 
would do well to learn from the four-year head start 
that publicly traded companies have had in this area. 
 What are the implications for public administration? 
A repeat of the Ge and McVay study among federal 
agencies should reveal important information for 
public managers. Readers of  PAR are reminded of an 
article written last year by George Boyne and col-
leagues on self-evaluating organizations ( Boyne et al. 
2004 ). Th ese GAO audits highlight the need for 
introspection to properly control internal controls. 
Th e six variables in that Boyne et al. cite are similar to 
the internal control standards identifi ed by the OMB. 
Future researchers may replicate Boyne using the 
OMB standards as variables. 
 Th ose whose interests lie outside the federal 
 government should note that the OMB ’ s standards 
are identical to those used by COSO, the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
 Commission. 1 Th e OMB does not fail to cite the 
importance of control and security over information 
technology, similar to the open-source COBIT 
 standards promulgated by the Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association. 2 Further, Appendix A 
to OMB Circular A-123 contains an implementation 
guide that practitioners at any level of government 
will fi nd helpful in controlling their internal controls. 
 Notes 
 1.  See  www.coso.org . 
 2.  COBIT is an acronym for Control Objectives 
for Information and Related Technology; see 
 www.iasaca.org . 
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